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SEC V. BAUER: IF THE GLOVE FITS, IT’S INSIDER 
TRADING 
Kramer Ortman+ 
“Insider trading is one of the few issues in securities regulation that has 
become a matter of cultural symbolism as well as legal controversy.”1  The 
public and the media are often captivated by stories of large-scale insider trading 
and corporate fraud schemes.2  However, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently dedicated itself to cracking down on 
such fraud, regardless of the size.3  Through this increased effort, the SEC is 
bringing insider trading claims under factual scenarios that highlight fraudulent 
activity in the evolving financial world, despite not exactly fitting the molds 
established by precedent.4  A federal court, in SEC v. Bauer, explored, but left 
unresolved, the threshold issue of whether the theories of insider trading may be 
used to impose liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
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 1. 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & 
PREVENTION § 1.1 (2013). 
 2. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 181 
(2006) (stating that despite the public’s typically fluctuating interest in insider trading, recent events 
have recaptured the public’s attention due to the prominent corporations and individuals involved, 
such as the Enron debacle and the Martha Stewart scandal); see also Peter S. Goodman, Insider 
Trading: ‘Steal A Lot, They Make you King’, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2010/11/22/insider-trading_n_786969.html (last updated May 5, 2011, 2:59 PM) (stating 
that the Bernie Madoff case attracted vast public interest because the nation could easily identify 
the wrongdoer with the financial crisis); see also Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of 
Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2008 Summer School: U.S. Experience of Insider Trading Enforcement 
(Feb. 19, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch021908lct.htm) 
(arguing that the public’s fascination with insider trading stems from the desire to understand what 
occurrence or characteristic, aside from greed, led successful, hard-working businessmen and 
women to commit such grandiose crimes). 
 3. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 25, 
2013) (explaining that insider trading violations remain a high priority for the SEC’s enforcement 
division).  The SEC brought fifty-eight insider trading actions in the fiscal year 2012.  Id.  In the 
three-year span from 2009 to 2012, the SEC filed 168 insider trading actions, which amounts to 
more actions than in any previous three-year period.  Id. 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1997) (endorsing the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading to comport to the alleged fraudulent activity even though 
that activity would not constitute insider trading under prior Supreme Court case law). 
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1934 (the Exchange Act) in connection with the redemption of mutual fund 
shares for the first time.5 
Insider trading is the “purchase or sale of securities, with scienter (or guilty 
knowledge), while in possession of material, non-public information in breach 
of a duty arising out of a fiduciary relationship.”6  Although insider trading is 
not explicitly proscribed in the statutes relating to general securities law,7 the 
underlying elements in all insider trading offenses are (1) the use of any 
“manipulative or deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security,” in contravention of rules promulgated by the SEC.8  The courts 
and the government have developed two prosecutorial theories of insider trading 
to determine guilt that include these elements.9 
The two theories of insider trading liability are the “classical theory” and the 
“misappropriation theory.”10  The classical theory describes a violation of 
insider trading laws by corporate insiders11 who trade in their corporation’s own 
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information.12  In contrast, the 
misappropriation theory describes a violation by persons, generally corporate 
outsiders, who misappropriate securities trading information given to them in 
trust by the source of the information.13  These theories represent two possible 
fact patterns that establish a basis for insider trading causes of action.14 
                                                            
 5. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that no federal court has ruled 
on the issue whether traditional insider trading theories apply to mutual fund redemptions). 
 6. Thomsen, supra note 2. 
 7. See Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme 
Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L., 865, 868 (2003) (discussing how section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is the only 
federal securities provision expressly prohibiting insider trading).  See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) 
(requiring corporate insiders to return profits made through certain trades within a six month 
period); see also RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON 
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 1.02 [1][a] (2010) (describing section 16(b) as restricting 
corporate insiders from unfairly benefiting from “short swing” trading profits). 
 8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)). 
 9. Quinn, supra note 7, at 869 (defining both the classical theory and misappropriation 
theory used to prosecute insider trading). 
 10. Id. 
 11. “Corporate insider” has commonly been defined to include “officers, directors, or 
controlling stockholders.”  Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, 
at *3 (Nov. 8, 1961).  However, the application of the classical theory has been extended to include, 
aside from traditional corporate insiders, any actors who hold momentary fiduciary duties to a 
corporation, such as attorneys or consultants.  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) 
(citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)). 
 12. See infra Part I.B.1 (tracking the development of the classical theory through case law). 
 13. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing the creation of the misappropriation theory). 
 14. See infra Parts I.B.1–2 (examining the fact patterns of cases charged using both insider 
trading theories). 
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In Bauer, the SEC struggled to apply either theory to the facts of the case.15  
Bauer arose after the SEC questioned the redemption of mutual fund shares by 
an account executive.16  Claiming that the redemption violated insider trading 
laws, the SEC pursued legal action against  Jilaine H. Bauer.17  The SEC 
originally won summary judgment, but dropped its classical theory liability 
argument on appeal, in favor of the alternative misappropriation theory.18  
Although the Seventh Circuit expressed some skepticism regarding the 
applicability of the misappropriation theory to the mutual fund context, the court 
did not outright reject the possibility that the SEC may utilize section 10(b) in 
this context.19 
This Note examines the novel issue of whether insider trading law can apply 
to a mutual fund executive who, with approval for the trade, redeems shares 
within the fund during an open trading window period.  First, this Note 
summarizes the relevant prior history of insider trading and then provides a 
background of Bauer.  After establishing these bases, this Note analyzes the 
application of insider trading law to Bauer.  Then, this Note first argues that the 
misappropriation theory applies within the context of redeeming shares in a 
mutual fund.  Second, it argues that the SEC can prove Bauer’s guilt using the 
necessary elements of insider trading theory. 
I.  INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY, THE “ANTI-FRAUD” PROVISIONS OF 
SECURITIES LAW, AND FURTHER CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT 
A.  The Statutory Basis for Insider Trading and the “Anti-Fraud” Provisions 
Although no statutes specifically proscribe insider trading in the United 
States, the primary statutory and regulatory bases for barring such conduct are 
“the ‘anti-fraud’ provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, . . 
. Rule 10b-5 issued under that Act, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
                                                            
 15. See infra note 18 and accompanying text (citing the change in theory used by the 
prosecution to convict Bauer). 
 16. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 767, 769–70. 
 19. Id. at 772. 
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1933.”20  Section 10(b)21 and Rule 10b-522 prohibit fraud in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security.23  Specifically, Section 10(b) outlaws the use of 
any deceptive device to buy or sell securities.24  Adopted by the SEC pursuant 
to its rulemaking power under section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to 
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”25  Additionally, the SEC 
can also bring charges for insider trading based on Section 17(a).26  Whereas 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to situations involving a security’s 
“purchase or sale,”27 Section 17(a) prohibits fraud in the “offer or sale of any 
securities.”28 
                                                            
 20. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *1 (Nov. 8, 
1961). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  Section 10(b) states that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or 
any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id. 
 22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  Rule 10b-5 provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. 
 23. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).  Section 17(a) provides that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or 
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly— 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
Id. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
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B.  Common Law Development of Insider Trading Law in the United States 
Insider trading law further developed through judicial interpretation of the 
anti-fraud provisions.29 Courts generally interpret these provisions to require 
deceptive conduct in order to find an insider trading violation.30 
The preeminent authority interpreting the anti-fraud provisions is In the 
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.31  In that case, the SEC found willful violations 
of the anti-fraud provisions when a broker-dealer and his firm sold securities 
based upon undisclosed information obtained from the director of the issuer, 
who was also an associate in the firm.32  The SEC held that corporate insiders 
have two options when trading in shares of their own corporation.33  The 
corporate insiders must either disclose all personally-known material 
information prior to conducting such trades or abstain from trading.34  Cady, 
Roberts also imposed a duty to disclose upon insiders with respect to both 
purchasing and selling the corporation’s shares.35 
1.  The Classical Theory 
The Supreme Court continued the statutory interpretation debate and endorsed 
the classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella v. United States.36  Under the 
classical theory, a corporate insider violates the anti-fraud provisions by trading 
in the corporation’s securities “on the basis of material, non-public information” 
                                                            
 29. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory 
Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider Trading Laws?, 
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2009) (stating that case analysis and application of insider 
trading laws exemplifies the common law development of legal theory); see also Donna M. Nagy, 
Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1322–23 
(2009) (explaining that courts play a critical role in defining the law of insider trading in the United 
States, due to the absence of a statute specifically banning insider trading). 
 30. Nagy, supra note 29, at 1322–23. 
 31. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *3 (Nov. 
8, 1961) (noting that the legislators enacted securities laws to ensure honesty and transparency in 
the purchase and sale of securities); see also Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation 
Theory of Insider Trading: Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 824 (1997) 
(noting the significance of the Cady decision). 
 32. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *1–2. 
 33. Id. at *3. 
 34. Id.  This obligation arises from the duty to disclose typically reserved for corporate 
insiders, such as directors or stockholders, which requires disclosing material information.  Id.  
Courts have generally held that “insiders must disclose all material facts which are known to them 
by virtue of their position but which are not to known to persons with whom they deal and which, 
if known, would affect their investment judgment.”  Id.  See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980) (expanding upon the common law rationale for this obligation). 
 35. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *3 (stating that investors who buy shares from 
corporate insiders are entitled to the same protections that require insiders to disclose special 
information in their possession, as those who sell shares to the insiders). 
 36. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230, 234–35 (rejecting a broad statutory interpretation that would 
include corporate outsiders in those groups with fiduciary duties to the corporation). 
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about the corporation.37  In Chiarella, the Supreme Court imposed this 
requirement specifically on corporate insiders.38  The Court held that Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not impose a duty to disclose on those individuals who 
possessed material, nonpublic information.39  However, the Court found that the 
fiduciary duties that corporate insiders owe to the corporation and its 
shareholders included the duty to either disclose all such information prior to 
trading or abstain from trading in the company’s stock.40 
Although Chiarella established this duty for corporate insiders, the Court 
exempted traders that owed no fiduciary duties to the corporation or its 
shareholders from liability.41  The defendant, in Chiarella, was neither a 
corporate officer nor an employee of the company whose shares were traded.42  
Rather, Chiarella was an employee of a company hired to print five 
announcements of various corporate takeover bids.43  Despite the masked 
identity of the companies involved within the documents given to the printer, 
Chiarella managed to decipher the identity of the “target companies” from 
additional information contained within the documents.44  After acquiring this 
information, but before the announcements were printed, Chiarella bought stock 
in the target companies.45  Chiarella later sold the shares after the corporate 
takeover bids were publicized and made a profit of roughly $30,000.46 
The Court rejected the notion that there was “a general duty between all 
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information.”47 Therefore, the Court held that Chiarella had not violated any 
securities laws under the classical theory of insider trading.48  The Court 
restricted the scope of insider trading liability to situations where the insider had 
“a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
                                                            
 37. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). 
 38. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29.  The court stated: 
[T]he duty to disclose arises when one party has information that the other party is 
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them. . . . [A] relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the 
shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential 
information by reason of their position with that corporation.  This relationship gives rise 
to a duty to disclose because of the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . . 
taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (original alterations omitted). 
 39. FERRARA, supra note 7, at § 2.02 [3]. 
 40. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; see also Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *3. 
 41. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. 
 42. Id. at 231. 
 43. Id. at 224. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 233 (giving the Court’s reasoning for rejecting the petitioner’s arguments). 
 48. Id. at 235. 
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parties to a transaction,” such as that held by corporate officers, directors, and 
shareholders.49 
However, since Chiarella, the duty to disclose or abstain under the classical 
theory of insider trading is no longer limited to traditional corporate insiders, 
such as officers and directors.  The Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC,50 in dicta, 
extended this duty to outsiders who can obtain status as “temporary insiders.”51  
This theory extends insider trading liability to outsiders “clothe[d] . . . with 
temporary insider status when the outsider obtains access to confidential 
information solely for corporate purposes in the context of a special confidential 
relationship.”52  Because of this corollary status, the temporary insider acquires 
a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders.53  Because a duty 
exists in these situations, the temporary insider can be held liable under the 
classical theory of insider trading.54 
2.  The Misappropriation Theory 
The Supreme Court endorsed a second theory to attach insider trading liability 
in United States v. O’Hagan: the misappropriation theory.55  According to the 
misappropriation theory, a person violates the anti-fraud provisions by 
                                                            
 49. Id. at 230.  The Court refused to entertain the notion of the misappropriation theory 
because the SEC only presented it on appeal, just like in Bauer.  See Counterattack From the 
Supreme Court: Chiarella v. United States, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_b.php (last visited June 7, 2014) 
(“[Justice] Powell discovered that this ‘misappropriation’ argument had not been presented to the 
jury, and he persuaded the Supreme Court to refuse to consider the theory in the case.”). 
 50. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).  See infra Part 1.B.3 (exploring tipper-tippee liability). 
 51. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, n.14 (establishing the parameters of the temporary insider’s role); 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting the influence of the 
Dirks decision). 
 52. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 565 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. 
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed 
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the 
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders.  The basis for 
recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic 
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential 
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to 
information solely for corporate purposes. . . . For such a duty to be imposed, however, 
the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information 
confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty. 
Id.  See also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (explaining that a temporary 
fiduciary duty may extend to outside service providers). 
 54. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 55. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  Although O’Hagan endorsed the misappropriation theory, the 
theory existed as an avenue to insider trading violations long before 1997.  See Kamman & Hood, 
supra note 29, at 374 n.39 (stating that the origins of the misappropriation theory go as far back as 
the dissent in Chiarella, after which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
endorsed the theory). 
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misappropriating confidential information for securities trading purposes, in 
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.  Under this theory, a 
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase 
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the 
principal of the exclusive use of that information.56 
Whereas the classical theory imposes a duty upon corporate insiders, the 
misappropriation theory imposes a duty upon corporate “outsiders.”57  Thus, the 
misappropriation theory protects against abuses by outsiders, who owe no 
fiduciary duty to the corporation, from using confidential information to profit 
from changes in stock prices.58  The breach can occur at a different time than the 
actual trade, as long as it somehow relates to the trade.59 
In O’Hagan, an attorney purchased common stock and call options of a 
potential takeover target based upon nonpublic information.60  O’Hagan learned 
of the potential takeover from confidential information obtained through his law 
firm, which represented the company planning the tender offer.61  Because 
O’Hagan was neither an officer nor had any relation the target company, the 
classical theory of insider trading did not apply.62  The Court nevertheless held 
that O’Hagan was guilty of insider trading, because he owed a fiduciary duty to 
his law firm, and when he used his law firm’s confidential information to trade, 
                                                            
 56. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citation omitted). 
 57. See id., 521 U.S. at 652–53 (stating that the misappropriation theory “outlaws trading on 
the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a 
trading party, but to the source of the information”). 
 58. See id. at 653.  The SEC issued Rule 10b5-2 to identify some of the circumstances under 
which a duty of trust or confidence arises such that its breach would constitute a misappropriation 
of confidential information.  These circumstances include: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the 
person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know 
that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the 
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or 
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or 
her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or 
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed 
with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably 
should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that 
the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties’ history, 
pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no 
agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2013). 
 59. The anti-fraud provisions make no mention of any time limitation imposed on acquiring 
the material nonpublic information and the purchase or sale of a security while using that 
information.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) (2012), 78j(b) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. 
 60. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 653 n.5. 
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he misappropriated such information.63  Therefore, the Court held that a 
corporate outsider is guilty of insider trading in connection with securities “when 
he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in 
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information,” rather than to 
the persons with whom he trades.64 
3.  Tipper-Tippee Liability 
Without establishing a new theory of insider trading, the Court expanded the 
concept of liable parties under the current theories of insider trading through 
“tipper-tippee” liability.65  Insider trading is not limited to corporate insiders 
who personally trade in securities based upon any inside information that they 
have acquired through normal fiduciary means.66  Under “tipper-tippee” 
liability, a corporate insider may be found guilty of insider trading by passing 
along inside information and “tipping” others to trade on the basis of this 
information.67  If the “tippee” trades on such information, knowing that the 
tipper’s disclosure of such information breaches a duty, then the tippee also 
violates federal securities laws.68 
The Supreme Court illustrated this theory in Dirks v. SEC.69  In Dirks, the 
Court addressed the issue of insider trading in the case of a securities analyst 
who received troubling information about a corporation and shared it with 
investors.70   The former insider, Ron Secrist, had been employed by a life 
insurance company controlled by Equity Funding Life Insurance Corp.71  
Dismayed at what he believed to be massive fraud by his former employer, he 
contacted Dirks, an analyst who specialized in insurance companies.72  Secrist 
did not have direct evidence for his allegations, but Dirks was impressed enough 
to conduct his own inquiries.73  Dirks, in turn, found sufficient support for 
                                                            
 63. Id. at 653–54, 666. 
 64. Id. at 652. 
 65. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (noting that tippees take on fiduciary duties 
based on confidential information they occasionally learn through inappropriate channels, which 
bars them from trading on such information). 
 66. See id. (stating that tippees receiving information from an insider take on the insider’s 
duty to the corporation and the shareholders). 
 67. See id. at 659–60 (observing that corporate insiders may not give information to 
outsiders). 
 68. See id. at 659–60, 664 (stating that “the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain”). 
 69. Id. at 659–64 (discussing the potential liability of recipients of confidential information 
for trading on that information). 
 70. Id. at 648–49. 
 71. Id. at 649. 
 72. Id. at 648–49. 
 73. Id. at 649. 
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Secrist’s claims of fraud and Dirks’ findings ultimately reached the SEC.74  In 
addition, he discussed his findings with various clients, some of whom traded 
on the information.75  The SEC brought charges against Dirks and some of 
Equity Funding’s insiders.76  Dirks appealed.77 
In Dirks, the Court articulated the general rule of law for “tipper-tippee” 
liability: “Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from 
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they 
also may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose 
of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”78  Accordingly, the Court 
found that the non-insider tippee “assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information . . . when the 
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the 
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach.”79  However, in order for a tippee to be found guilty of insider 
trading, the insider who passed along the information must “benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from his disclosure.”80 
The Court, applying the tipper-tippee rule of law to the facts of Dirks, found 
that the insider who provided Dirks the information did not benefit from the 
disclosure.81  Rather, the insider disclosed the confidential information in order 
to expose apparent fraud within the company.82  Because the insider did not 
“benefit, directly or indirectly from his disclosure,”83 the Court held that the 
                                                            
 74. Id. at 649–50 (stating that after Dirks spread the word of his findings, particularly through 
contacting newspapers, and after the stock price fell over forty percent, the SEC began to investigate 
Equity Funding and, ultimately, Dirks). 
 75. Id. at 649. 
 76. Id. at 650–52 (recognizing Dirks’ key role in unveiling the fraud and bringing reduced 
charges as a result). 
 77. Id. at 652. 
 78. Id. at 659 (explaining the need to attach liability to tipper-tippee trading). 
 79. Id. at 660.  The Court further explained that a tippee’s responsibility requires that the 
tippee knew that the confidential information that the tippee received violated an assumed fiduciary 
duty.  Id. at 661 (quoting In re Investors Mgmt. Co., Securities Act Release No. 9267, 44 S.E.C 
633, 651 (1971)). 
 80. Id. at 662 (establishing the test for liability in tipper-tippee trading cases). 
 81. Id. at 666–67 & n.27 (deciding that no breach of fiduciary duty to the company’s 
shareholders existed). 
 82. Id. (finding that the insider’s intent in sharing information with Dirks was to reveal fraud, 
not to perpetuate fraudulent investments). 
 83. See id. at 662, 666 n.27. 
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insider had not breached a duty to the company’s shareholders.84  Therefore, the 
Court decided that the tippee could not be held liable for insider trading.85 
C.  The Necessary Elements of Insider Trading 
1.  Scienter 
Regardless of the applicable insider trading theory, a violation of insider 
trading laws requires that a person act with scienter.86  Scienter is defined as “a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”87 
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,88 the Supreme Court considered the requisite 
state of mind required to prove civil liability under Rule 10b-5.89  In this case, 
the president of a bank engaged in a fraudulent investment scheme that involved 
his conversion of customer funds for personal use.90  The accounting firm, Ernst 
& Ernst, was accused of negligence with regard to its auditing duties to the 
bank.91  The Court found that the negligence claims could not support liability 
because Section 10(b) requires intentionality in order to establish scienter.92  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the “manipulative or deceptive” 
language used with “device or contrivance” in Section 10(b), strongly suggested 
                                                            
 84. See id. at 666 (stating that the insiders breached no duty to shareholders).  The Court 
decided Dirks under the classical theory of insider trading.  See id. at 657–59 (discussing in detail 
the application of the classical theory as developed by Chiarella); see also supra Part I.B.1 (tracking 
the development and definition of the classical theory).  A person could also theoretically “tip” 
another person based on misappropriated information.  The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on 
whether the Dirks principles apply to trading based on the misappropriation theory.  See FERRARA, 
supra note 7, at § 2.02 [6][D][iv] (stating that in O’Hagan, the Court did not decide whether the 
misappropriation theory applied to a tip based on misappropriated information).  On the other hand, 
the lower courts have not hesitated to find tipping liability in misappropriation cases.  See id.  
However, there is a split over whether the requirement of a personal benefit to the tipper applies 
within this theory.  Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring the SEC 
to prove that one who misappropriated the information expected to benefit from the tip), with SEC 
v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that liability under the 
misappropriation theory does not require that the tipper benefit from the tip). 
 85. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666. 
 86. In Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court decided whether the SEC needed to establish scienter 
as an element of an enforcement action brought under the federal securities laws anti-fraud 
provisions.  446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980).  Based on the statutory language and the legislative history, 
the Court found that those bringing claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must prove scienter 
regardless of the plaintiff and relief sought.  Id. at 691. 
 87. Id. at 686 n.5 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 & n.12 (1976)) 
(discussing whether plaintiffs may bring claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without 
establishing scienter). 
 88. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 89. Id. at 187–88. 
 90. Id. at 189. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  See also Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(stating that negligence does not give rise to a Section 10(b) claim). 
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that Congress intended the statute to require knowing or intentional 
misconduct.93 
Although the Supreme Court determined that the anti-fraud provisions 
required some form of intentionality to prove the element of scienter,94 what 
form the intent must take remains unclear.95  The Court has not answered this 
question, but lower courts overwhelmingly say that recklessness is sufficient to 
prove scienter.96  However, many of these courts continue to hold that 
recklessness entails a subjective aspect related to purposefully avoiding the 
truth.97 
Courts in the Seventh Circuit have interpreted intentionality to include 
recklessness.98  In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,99 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that “a reckless omission 
of material facts upon which the plaintiff put justifiable reliance in connection 
with a sale or purchase of securities is actionable under Section 10(b) as fleshed 
out by Rule 10b-5.”100 The court, in Sundstrand, defined recklessness as: 
[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or 
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading 
buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious 
that the actor must have been aware of it.101 
                                                            
 93. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (explaining that the words are not ambiguous, but 
necessitate that the statute must be read to require intent). 
 94. See id. at 189. 
 95. See Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter 
Requirement, 3 (Georgetown Publ. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 12-111, 2012), 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2018&context= 
facpub (noting the lack of clarity over the meaning of intentionality and discussing whether 
recklessness is sufficient). 
 96. Id. at 3–4.  See also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING, § 
4.4.2 (1996) (discussing the requirements to prove scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).  
The Supreme Court has noted that all lower courts find scienter present with intentionality and 
recklessness, but that the level of recklessness required differs depending on the circuit.  Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007).  In Tellabs, the degree of 
recklessness necessary to satisfy the scienter requirement was not presented for the Supreme Court 
to decide.  Id. 
 97. Langevoort, supra note 95, at 3–4. 
 98. See e.g., SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 775 (7th Cir. 2013).  Bauer’s case is being 
prosecuted in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  As such, its case law 
governing the required elements of insider trading governs the application of insider trading to 
Bauer. 
 99. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 100. Id. at 1044. 
 101. Id. at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. 
Okla. 1976) vacated by Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 864 (10th Cir. 
1980)).  The Seventh Circuit’s definition of recklessness is the one most commonly followed across 
the jurisdictions.  See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
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The court analogized fraud under Rule 10b-5 to common law fraud to reach 
the conclusion that recklessness was sufficient to establish a cause of action.102  
According to the Seventh Circuit, “[a]t common law reckless behavior was 
sufficient to support causes of action sounding in fraud or deceit,” therefore, “it 
would be highly inappropriate to construe the Rule 10b-5 remedy to be more 
restrictive than its common law analogs.”103 
2.  Materiality 
Because the anti-fraud provisions prohibit the use of “any untrue statement of 
a material fact” or the exclusion of “a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made . . . not misleading,”104 materiality is a frequently disputed 
element discussed in insider trading cases.105  The Supreme Court entered the 
debate about the definition of materiality for the purposes of Rule 10b-5 in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson.106  In Basic, former employees of Basic sued the company 
claiming Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations after they sold their company 
shares at exaggeratedly low prices in a market where Basic’s misleading 
statements kept the stock price depressed.107  The claimants argued that Basic 
violated the anti-fraud provisions by repeatedly claiming that they were not 
privy to merger negotiations, when in fact a merger was developing during this 
time.108  Less than two months after Basic’s last statement denying a merger, 
Basic merged with another company and announced the deal the following 
day.109 
In assessing whether the denial of discussions related to a possible merger was 
material within the context of federal securities laws, the Court stated that 
information is deemed material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor 
as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”110  
The Court found no valid reason to exclude discussions concerning possible 
                                                            
REGULATION 843 (3d ed. 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 7245 (1995) (statement of Rep. Blilely) 
(stating the importance of the Sundstrand definition of recklessness). 
 102. Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
 105. See e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1987) (discussing the materiality 
requirement). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 228. 
 108. Id. at 227–28.  In three separate statements following heavy days of trading of Basic stock 
and inquiries into the matter, Basic denied that it had knowledge of any forthcoming business 
developments that could explain the stock activity.  See id. at 227 n.4 (stating that the company did 
not know of any events that would affect its trading activity). 
 109. Id. at 227–28.  Basic’s last statement denying a possible merger was issued to its 
shareholders on November 6, 1978.  Id. at 227–28 n.4.  The merger deal was endorsed by Basic on 
December 19, 1978.  Id. at 228. 
 110. Id. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
1088 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:1075 
mergers, but it did not develop a bright-line rule for assessing materiality.111  
Rather, the Court held that “[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or 
occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such 
as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.”112  As such, 
materiality includes a subjective and objective assessment.113 
3.  “On the Basis of” 
Another element required for insider trading is that the person charged must 
trade in reliance on, or “on the basis” of, material, nonpublic information.114  
Under Rule 10b5-1, this requirement is met if the person trading was aware of 
the material, nonpublic information.115  However, the rule also sets forth several 
affirmative defenses or exceptions to liability.116  Rule 10b5-1 allows persons to 
trade in certain, specified circumstances where it is clear that the information 
                                                            
 111. Id. at 236 (stating that although a bright-line rule may be easier to follow and to apply, 
“ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and 
Congress’ policy decisions”). 
 112. Id.; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 (stating that “[t]he determination [of materiality] 
requires delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given 
set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly 
ones for the trier of fact”); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51721 
(Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, & 249) (“While we acknowledge in the 
Proposing Release that materiality judgments can be difficult, we do not believe an appropriate 
answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of ‘material’ items for 
purposes of Regulation FD.”). 
 113. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.  By not mandating a bright-line rule for determining the 
materiality of a statement or omission, the Court utilized a subjective test.  Id.  This subjective test 
allows courts to scrutinize different factual scenarios in order to determine the “fact-specific 
finding” of materiality.  Id.  However, the test is not limited to a subjective component; rather, in 
formulating the rule, the Court included an objective standard as well.  See id. at 231–32.  The 
Court “expressly adopt[ed] the TSC Industries standard for materiality,” which required a 
determination of whether the “reasonable investor” would deem the statement or omission “as 
having significantly altered the total mix of information” available to the public.  Id. at 231–32 
(quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a)–(b) (2013); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
651–52 (1997) (discussing the elements of both the classical and misappropriation theories of 
insider trading). 
 115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b).  “[A] purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is ‘on the basis 
of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase 
or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or 
sale.”  Id.  Congress passed Rule 10b5-1 to resolve the federal circuit splits about whether the courts 
should look to either “possession” or “use” of material nonpublic information as an appropriate 
standard in insider trading cases.  Jennifer L. Neumann, Insider Trading: Does “Aware” Really 
Resolve the “Possession” Versus “Use” Debate?, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 189 (2001).  The 
basis for Rule 10b5-1 is found in case law.  See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 197 n.44 (7th Cir. 
1978) (explaining that although insiders immediately selling a large portion of their stock followed 
by the public disclosure of information that leads to a decrease in the company’s stock price gives 
rise to the inference that the insider was acting upon the information, the inference can be negated 
by a showing that the sales were consistent with past sales or occurred pursuant to a plan). 
 116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c). 
2014] If the Glove Fits, It's Insider Trading 1089 
they possess is not a factor in the decision to trade, such as pursuant to a pre-
existing plan, contract, or instruction that was made in good faith.117  However, 
not all jurisdictions strictly adhere to Rule 10b5-1’s possession requirement.118 
Courts must examine the necessary elements and the established precedents, 
along with the specific facts of the case, to determine whether a theory of insider 
trading applies.  If applicable, the defendant must be found guilty of insider 
trading. 
II.  THE CASE OF BAUER 
A.  Events Leading Up to Prosecution 
Jilaine Bauer (Bauer) is a securities lawyer who was once employed by 
Heartland Advisors, Inc. (HAI).119  HAI managed the portfolios for Heartland 
Group, Inc. (HGI), which served as the underwriter and distributor of HGI’s 
mutual fund shares (Funds).120  During the relevant time period, Bauer served in 
various high-level company management and board positions for both HAI and 
HGI.121 
In 1999 and continuing through Bauer’s redemption of her shares, the Funds 
experienced significant liquidity problems caused by substantial redemptions 
and by a growing number of bonds in the Funds’ portfolio that either defaulted 
or were placed on a possible default “watch list.”122  In addition, HAI struggled 
to sell the Funds’ securities at book value, which led to further concerns 
regarding the Funds’ valuation and the discussion of price reductions.123  In the 
midst of these problems, one of the Fund managers tendered his resignation.124 
Bauer subsequently put trading restrictions in place for all HAI personnel who 
                                                            
 117. Id. (naming elements of the affirmative defenses to Rule 10b5-1). 
 118. See Audrey Strauss, Recent Insider Trading Jury Charges: ‘Possession’ vs. ‘Use’, N.Y. 
L.J., July 7, 2011, at 5, 7 (explaining that Congress’ adoption of Rule 10b5-1 did not seem to resolve 
the “possession” v. “use” debate).  Rather, recent jury instructions in the Second Circuit have 
broken away from the awareness requirement; instead, the courts have instructed juries that they 
must find that the defendant actually used the information.  Id. 
 119. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013).  HAI is both an investment adviser and 
a broker-dealer.  Id. 
 120. Id.  HGI is an open-end management investment company.  Id.  A mutual fund is a 
collection of financial assets, primarily securities, that belongs to the individual investors who hold 
ownership shares in the fund.  Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (citing Burks 
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)).  The Funds included the “Short Duration Fund” and the “High 
Yield Fund.”  Bauer, 723 F.3d at 762. 
 121. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 762.  During this time period, Bauer served as general counsel, chief 
compliance officer, senior vice president, and secretary for HAI.  Id.  In 2000, Bauer also served as 
chairperson of HAI’s Pricing Committee.  Id.  She was also vice president and was elected secretary 
of HGI.  Id. 
 122. Id. at 763–64. 
 123. Id. at 764. 
 124. Id.  In order to create a transition plan, the manager and the Board agreed to defer the 
resignation until late September 2000.  Id. 
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had become aware of the tendered resignation.125  The Board and the Pricing 
Committee regularly met during this time period to discuss options to deal with 
the Funds’ pricing and liquidity problems.126 
At the end of September 2000, HAI issued a press release announcing the 
departure of the Fund manager and the hiring of a replacement.127  Bauer lifted 
the previously imposed trading restrictions after informing HGI’s board, its 
independent counsel, the President of both HAI and HGI, and the Vice President 
and Chief Operating Officer of HAI of the Fund manager’s departure.128  A few 
days later, Bauer phoned in her order to redeem all of her shares in the Short 
Duration Fund for $44,627.15.129  During the phone call, Bauer identified herself 
by name and stated that she was an HAI employee.130  The Funds’ problems 
continued, and approximately two weeks after Bauer’s redemption, HAI 
instituted widespread cuts that resulted in a drastic drop to the Funds’ net asset 
values (NAVs).131  Several months later, the Funds entered receivership.132 
B.  Trial Proceedings 
The SEC sued Bauer for insider trading and other securities law violations in 
December 2003.133  In May 2011, the district court granted the SEC summary 
judgment on the insider trading charges.134  Bauer appealed.135 
                                                            
 125. Id.  While serving as chief compliance officer, Bauer instituted the company’s policy 
against insider trading, which prohibited HAI employees from trading in securities that the Fund 
held on the basis of confidential information.  Id. at 762. 
 126. Id. at 764–67 (tracking the meetings and reporting the discussions that took place). 
 127. Id. at 765. 
 128. Id. at 766. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 767.  The “haircuts” resulted in a drop in the Short Duration Fund’s NAV by over 
forty-four percent, and a drop in the High Yield Fund’s NAV by over sixty-nine percent.  Id. 
 132. Id.  Receivership is a form of bankruptcy whereby the courts or creditors appoint a 
receiver to oversee the company’s bankruptcy proceedings.  Receivership, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/receivership.asp (last visited June 8, 2014).  The receiver 
may be appointed by a court or governing body.  Id.  The receiver has the authority to make 
decisions on behalf of the company and decides how to manage and distribute the company’s assets.  
Id. 
 133. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 767.  All of the related defendants to the case except Bauer came to an 
agreement with the SEC and settled their claims out of court.  Id. 
 134. Id.  The district court granted summary judgment based on the stipulation that Bauer was 
an insider in possession of confidential information when she redeemed her shares and because 
there was no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the materiality and scienter elements.  
Id.  In September 2011, the district court dismissed all of the remaining claims originally brought 
against Bauer.  Id. 
 135. Id. 
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C.  The Appeal 
Despite winning summary judgment by advancing the classical theory of 
insider trading, the SEC changed tactics on appeal.136  The SEC dropped the 
classical theory and argued only the misappropriation theory.137 
The Seventh Circuit, in its opinion, acknowledged that this action was unique 
because it was “one of the few instances in which the SEC has brought insider 
trading claims in connection with a mutual fund redemption.”138  The court 
explained that “[n]o federal court has directly opined on the applicability of 
insider trading prohibitions to the trade of mutual fund shares,”139 primarily 
because “the SEC has never brought a § 10(b) claim in the mutual fund 
context.”140  The court went on to state several critical observations. 
First, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court did not properly 
understand the uniqueness of the claims and the “threshold” legal issues.141  
More specifically, the district court did not consider “whether, and to what 
extent, the [classical and misappropriation] insider trading theories apply to 
mutual fund redemptions.”142  Second, the court observed that although the 
district court relied on the classical theory of insider trading, it “did not, 
however, weigh the novelty of the SEC’s claims in the mutual fund context.”143  
Third, the Seventh Circuit found that the misappropriation theory had never been 
presented to the district court.144 
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for several 
reasons.145  Regarding the question of whether Bauer’s conduct constituted 
deception under insider trading theories, the court declined to consider the 
classical theory of insider trading because the SEC failed to argue the issue on 
appeal.146  With respect to the misappropriation theory, the Seventh Circuit held 
                                                            
 136. Id. at 770.  The court disagreed with the SEC’s argument that at the district court level, it 
did not choose between the classical or misappropriation theory.  Id. at 770 n.4.  The SEC argued 
that they put Bauer on notice that she could be held liable for either theory.  Id. 
 137. Id. at 769–70. 
 138. Id. at 762. 
 139. Id. at 762. 
 140. Id. at 769. 
 141. Id. at 762. 
 142. Id. at 769.  Based on this omission, the district court had not been called upon to categorize 
Bauer’s conduct as violating either insider trading theory.  Id. at 771. 
 143. Id. at 770.  By failing to weigh the novelty of the claim, the district court did not describe 
how the classical theory applied to mutual fund redemptions.  Id. 
 144. Id.  Because the district court had not been presented with an argument regarding the 
application of the misappropriation theory, the Seventh Circuit had been asked to affirm summary 
judgment based on a theory of insider trading that was never presented to the district court and on 
a district court opinion that failed to consider whether either the classical or misappropriation theory 
applies to mutual fund redemptions.  Id. 
 145. Id. at 762. 
 146. Id. at 771.  The court found that by not briefing the court on the classical theory, the SEC 
forfeited its ability to argue the theory.  Id. 
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that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to deprive Bauer of the opportunity to 
fully develop arguments and present evidence regarding that theory.147  Given 
the novelty of the issue presented, the court further reasoned that remand was 
warranted.148  Although it expressed some skepticism regarding the SEC’s 
position, the court clarified that it was not denying the applicability of an insider 
trading claim involving the buying and selling of mutual fund shares based on 
the misappropriation theory.149 
Even though the Seventh Circuit did not rule on the applicability of the 
misappropriation theory, its decision to remand the case highlighted the 
importance of the opinion.  The court allowed the district court to opine on the 
misappropriation theory first.150  By doing so, the appellate court secured the 
right to review the lower court’s decison rather than serving as the sole 
adjudicator of the issue and risking a final decision on such a novel issue.151 
III.  THE REDEMPTION OF BAUER’S MUTUAL FUND SHARES AS A VIOLATION 
OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
The policy rationales underlying the prohibitions against insider trading are 
centered on the principles of fairness, efficiency, and market integrity.152  Based 
on these principles, insider trading law operates to prevent fraud, manipulation, 
and deception in the capital markets.153  Courts remember these policies when 
deciding whether an individual’s acts constitute insider trading.154  Although the 
classical and misappropriation theories, in their current form, have allowed 
courts to more easily determine whether a factual scenario amounts to a violation 
of insider trading, insider trading cannot be forced into a predetermined mold.155  
                                                            
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 772.  The court stated that even if the parties present the same evidence, the district 
court judge should rule on the issue before the appellate court decides whether the misappropriation 
theory applies.  Id. at 771. 
 149. Id. at 772 (stating the court is seeking clarity to understand how the elements of insider 
trading might arise in the mutual fund redemption context). 
 150. Id. at 771–72, 777 (citing the novelty of the issue among reasons for its decision to remand 
the case). 
 151. See id. at 771, 777 (remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings). 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012) (discussing why it is necessary to regulate the securities and 
exchange markets); see also Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting a policy 
argument about how insider trading is unfair to other investors and should be discouraged). 
 153. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A 
Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1169 (2003) (discussing the underlying policy reasons 
for insider trading anti-fraud provisions). 
 154. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246–47 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that when flexibly construing the anti-fraud provisions, it is important that a court’s ruling 
is consistent with the purposes of the federal securities laws). 
 155. See Nagy, supra note 29, at 1317–20.  The Supreme Court in O’Hagan reversed twenty 
years of Supreme Court precedent that took a narrow view of the federal securities laws, especially 
Section 10(b).  Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
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Therefore, the courts must recognize the flexibility of the doctrine and appreciate 
the underlying policy rationales when applying the current theories of insider 
trading to Bauer’s factual scenario.156 
A.  The SEC Correctly Abandoned the Classical Theory of Insider Trading on 
Appeal 
Even though the SEC abandoned the classical theory on appeal, and the Court 
of Appeals supported the logic of this decision,157 the impact on future cases 
makes it necessary to understand why the classical theory cannot apply to the 
facts of Bauer.  The classical theory targets a corporate insider who breached a 
duty to the corporation with which the insider traded and that corporation’s 
shareholders.158  The court found Bauer to be a corporate insider, and as such, 
she owed a fiduciary duty to the counterparties of the transaction.159 
Under the classical theory, Bauer must have either disclosed all information 
in her possession regarding the transaction to the counterparty or abstained from 
trading in the Fund for the transaction to be legal and to not violate insider 
trading law.160  The counterparty to Bauer’s redemption, in the transaction under 
investigation, was the mutual fund itself.161  However, requiring disclosure to 
                                                            
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1244–45 (1998) (discussing United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). 
 156. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (stating that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is not 
limited to deceiving a purchaser or seller of securities, but applies to any deception “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246–47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that 
federal securities laws must be interpreted flexibly).  The text of the anti-fraud provisions reflects 
the expansiveness of the rules.  The text prohibits “any person . . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security” from employing “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of” SEC rules.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added).  The repeated use of the word 
“any” is important when applying the rules to various factual scenarios.  See Affiliated Ute Citizens 
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (stating that the word “any” designates that the 
anti-fraud provisions must be viewed broadly and inclusively); see also Nagy, supra note 155, at 
1296 n.344 (highlighting that federal securities laws must be interpreted flexibly to cover all the 
activities that Congress intended to prevent) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah, 406 U.S. at 
151). 
 157. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 158. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52; see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the classical theory 
of insider trading). 
 159. SEC v. Bauer, No. 03-C-1427, 2011 LEXIS 56780, at *36 (E.D. Wis. May 25, 2011) 
(finding that Bauer qualified as an insider when she engaged in the trading activity in question), 
rev’d, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013).  The appellate court noted that the SEC and Bauer both agreed 
that at the time of the transaction in question, Bauer was an insider. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 770.  At the 
district court, the SEC made no attempt to expand Bauer’s role from a traditional insider of HAI, 
but acting as an outsider, to HGI in her redemption of her fund shares.  Id. 
 160. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that the duty for corporate insiders 
under the classical theory established by the Chiarella court). 
 161. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-2860), 2012 WL 6563351, at *5 (stating that a mutual fund is the redeeming party’s 
counterpart). 
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the counterparty would not make sense if the counterparty knew all of the 
material information because the purpose of the disclosure is to ensure that all 
parties to the transaction are equally informed.162  In Bauer’s case, the executives 
who ran the mutual fund had all of the material information that Bauer had in 
her possession.163  Consequently, nondisclosure to the mutual fund would not 
create unfairness within the transaction between the two parties.164  Bauer did 
not take advantage of increased information then available to the 
counterparty.165 Therefore, Bauer argued the classical theory could not be the 
basis for an insider trading violation.166 
Although the Court of Appeals did not rule on whether the classical theory 
could apply in the mutual fund context,167 the court’s reasoning and the SEC’s 
decision to abandon this theory on appeal showed that the classical theory did 
not accurately apply to the facts of Bauer.168  Additionally, the SEC’s 
abandonment of a theory after advancing it for twelve years illuminates the 
SEC’s struggle to find a viable theory of insider trading on which to convict 
Bauer.169 
B.  The Misappropriation Theory and Its Application to Bauer 
On appeal, the SEC changed its argument to rely upon the misappropriation 
theory.170  The misappropriation theory targets persons, insiders or outsiders,171 
                                                            
 162. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4 (Nov. 
8, 1961) (recognizing the unfairness of insider trading because it allows one party to benefit based 
on information that is not available to other parties). 
 163. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 764–67 (stating all of the information Bauer possessed and 
discussed with the Board in relation to the problems with the mutual funds). 
 164. Id. at 771 (stating that “the mutual fund [] is always fully informed and cannot be duped 
through nondisclosure”); see also Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 161, at 5 
(arguing that it would be illogical for insiders to disclose information to the mutual fund). 
 165. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 166. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 771 (summarizing Bauer’s reasoning against the applicability of the 
classical theory).  For the classical theory to better fit this transaction, the theory would need to be 
expanded within the context of mutual funds to include protections for those shareholders owning 
portions of the fund.  If the misappropriation theory did not support remedial claims for these 
shareholders, this would be an interesting expansion of the classical theory, giving it a much broader 
effect.  This expansion argument is similar to the argument that seeks to expand the class of 
breached fiduciaries under the misappropriation theory.  See Nagy, supra note 155, at 1309–10 
(arguing that the misappropriation theory should not solely be based on a breach to the source of 
the information, but rather a breach to all securities holders of the company holding the 
information). 
 167. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 771 (declining to examine whether the classical theory applies because 
the SEC did not raise the issue in its briefs). 
 168. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
 169. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 770–71. 
 170. Id. at 771; see also Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee at 29, SEC v. Bauer, 723 
F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2860), 2012 WL 6018890, at *29. 
 171. The misappropriation theory is commonly phrased to target corporate outsiders.  See 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997) (stating that “the misappropriation theory 
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who misuse confidential information within the context of trading securities “in 
breach of a duty . . . owed to the source of the information.”172  In remanding the 
case, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the applicability of the 
misappropriation theory.173  The misappropriation theory’s broad scope can be 
applied to hold Bauer liable under insider trading law for redeeming her 
shares.174 
Bauer does not initially appear to be an outsider and does not fit the class of 
persons commonly found guilty under the misappropriation theory.175  Based on 
this fact alone, the misappropriation theory should not apply to Bauer.176  
However, as stated in Dirks, theories of insider trading can expand to fit 
individuals with a particular status into a theory of insider trading.177  As such, 
the misappropriation theory should not be discounted solely because the court 
found Bauer to be a corporate insider.178 
In order to determine whether the misappropriation theory applies to Bauer’s 
transaction, the court must judge whether Bauer’s redemption of the Fund shares 
violates the purpose of this theory.179  The misappropriation theory is designed 
to “protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by outsiders” 
who owe a duty to the source of the information and not the shareholders.180  
Because the duty is to the source of the information, disclosure to the source of 
the information prevents deception.181  Without deception, no fraud exists and 
                                                            
outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’”).  However, the 
theory is not limited in this sense.  Rather, the use of “outsiders” is meant to reflect the 
misappropriation theory’s contrasting and much broader application than the classical theory.  See 
Nagy, supra note 155, at 1307–10 (highlighting the breadth of the misappropriation theory’s 
possible interpretations). 
 172. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. 
 173. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 772.  In its opinion, the Court of Appeals highlighted the questionable 
conduct of Bauer, and through the remand, invited the SEC to introduce the misappropriation theory 
to the district court rather than have the appellate court issue a ruling on a theory that had not been 
applied and adjudicated in the case at hand.  Id. at 772–73. 
 174. See infra notes 197–205 and accompanying text (discussing why the misappropriation 
theory can be applied to Bauer). 
 175. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 772 (remarking upon the intense level of involvement that 
investment advisors have with the funds they manage). 
 176. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (discussing how the misappropriation theory applies to 
corporate outsiders who do not owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders). 
 177. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 178. There has been debate concerning the definition of fraud in the insider trading context.  
See Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–17 (2011) (highlighting 
the uncertainty about when fraud applies to securities law).  However, if fraud is seemingly 
apparent, the exact status or title of a person should not shield her from liability. 
 179. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53 (describing the circumstances to which the 
misappropriations theory applies). 
 180. Id. at 653 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 181. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing an insider’s duty to 
disclose or abstain from trading when the insider possesses confidential information, so that the 
insider does not breach the insider’s fiduciary duty). 
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one cannot be held liable for insider trading.182  Here, Bauer identified herself as 
an HAI employee by name during her redemption.183  Bauer disclosed her 
identity over the phone to an operator, but did not inform the Board of her 
intention to redeem all of her shares.184  Because the Board is the source of the 
information, Bauer would need to disclose to the Board in order to prevent 
deception.185  Under this analysis, it appears that Bauer’s redemption of her 
shares breached her duty to the mutual fund.186  Therefore, the misappropriation 
theory should apply to Bauer’s actions.187 
                                                            
 182. See Laura D. Mruk, The Proverbial Axe to the Judicial Oak: The Impact of Stoneridge on 
Plaintiff’s Actions Under § 10(b), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 281, 297 (2009) (stating that at common 
law, on which section 10(b) is based, deception was broad enough to include misleading conduct 
and the act of concealing information). 
 183. See supra note 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 184. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing the phone call Bauer made 
to redeem her shares and not describing any actions Bauer took to tell the Board of her redemption). 
 185. The Board is the source of the information, because the Board maintained all of the 
discussions regarding the various problems affecting the mutual fund.  See id. at 764–67 (describing 
the Board’s meetings to address the Fund’s problems). 
 186. Because Bauer became aware of the material information through the Board, the 
information is to be used solely by the Board to manage and price the Funds and not for the personal 
benefit of one of the Board members.  See id. (describing how Bauer came into contact with the 
information through the Board); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653–54 (1997) 
(explaining the company’s nonpublic information is the type of property over which a company 
has exclusive rights). 
 187. It should also be noted that if it is determined that the classical and the misappropriation 
theories cannot be applied to convict Bauer of insider trading, the SEC is not limited to the current 
theories of insider trading.  See supra note 157 and accompanying text.  Rather, these theories were 
developed as various ways to interpret the anti-fraud provisions.  See Thomsen, supra note 2 
(explaining that court interpretations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have had a significant impact 
in shaping and changing the contours of insider trading).  As witnessed in O’Hagan, the courts may 
endorse new theories based on the arguments advanced. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–54; see also 
FERRARA, supra note 7, at § 2.02 [7] (discussing a third theory of insider trading accepted by the 
Second Circuit that based liability on acquiring material nonpublic information by fraudulent 
means).  However, in the past, the Court has found limitations when interpreting the anti-fraud 
provisions.  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (stating that although 
Section 10(b) may be viewed broadly, it is limited to prosecuting fraud consistent with the statute’s 
language and purpose) (quoting Toche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)); see 
also Thomsen, supra note 2 (highlighting the flexibility of insider trading while acknowledging the 
limits of existing law and the importance of new laws in society).  The Court endorsed the 
misappropriation theory in O’Hagan because the issue in question involved the statutorily required 
deceptive conduct “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities.  O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 
659.  To successfully advance a new theory, the SEC would have to argue a theory that would 
encompass the necessary elements.  See supra Parts I.C.1-3 (defining the elements of insider 
trading); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35 (refusing to apply a new theory of liability that did 
not meet the necessary elements established by Section 10(b)).  The theory would also have to 
advance the principals established originally in Cady, Roberts and followed subsequently by the 
Court in Chiarella.  The two elements from Cady, Roberts for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation 
are: “(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take 
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.”  Id. at 227. 
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C.  The Necessary Elements of Insider Trading Exist in Bauer 
1.  The Redemption Was “on the Basis of” Nonpublic Information 
Rule 10b5-1 establishes that trading meets this required element if the person 
was aware of the information when the trading occurred.188  In Bauer’s case, 
Bauer was aware of the Fund’s liquidity and management struggles.189  
Therefore, the fact pattern satisfies this element, unless Bauer can claim an 
affirmative defense or exception to the rule.190  Bauer moved to nullify the 
inference of insider trading by attempting to justify her redemption on various 
factors, including a planned move to California pursuant to new employment 
and a personal struggle with the volatility of the Fund.191  If the court accepted 
these reasons as true, Bauer’s redemption could qualify for an exception.192  
However, the court would not likely reach this conclusion given the timing of 
the redemption and the fact that Bauer had yet to be offered a job in California.193 
2.  The Information Traded on Is Material 
Any claim of insider trading must involve the defendant trading on material 
information.194  Here, Bauer failed to divulge her knowledge of the management 
and liquidity struggles of the Fund.195  Although this fact is no doubt material, 
“[a]n insider of an open-end fund generally would not be able to exploit insider 
information . . . because an open-end fund is required to price its shares . . . at 
NAV.”196  This means that the mutual fund must be priced daily in order to 
                                                            
 188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(b) (2013). 
 189. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 769 (stating that Bauer attended a board meeting, where the board 
discussed the Funds’ problems); see also supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(c) (outlining affirmative defenses that individuals may use to 
avoid liability). 
 191. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 161, at 20, 2012 WL 6563351, at *20. 
 192. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (explaining the circumstances that alleviate 
liability from trading “on the basis” of certain information). 
 193. Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee, supra note 170, at 47–49, 2012 WL 6018890, 
at *47–49. 
 194. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 768–69 (citing SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (stating that the SEC must prove that Bauer made a material misrepresentation or 
omission)). 
 195. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 766 (describing Bauer’s knowledge of the Funds’ problems, but 
saying nothing about Bauer disclosing this knowledge). 
 196. Select Sector SPDR Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 3, 1999 WL 185555, at *3 (May 6, 
1999).  NAV stands for “net asset value.”  See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (describing redemption 
based on net asset value); see also Mercer E. Bullard, Insider Trading in Mutual Funds, 84 OR. L. 
REV. 821, 824-25 (2005). 
When calculating a fund’s net asset value, its portfolio securities must be valued, if 
‘market quotations are readily available,’ at their current market value.  If market 
quotations are not readily available, portfolio securities must be valued based on their 
‘fair value as determined in good faith by the [fund’s] board of directors.’  Funds choose 
the time or times of day as of which they price their shares, but in practice, virtually all 
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reflect all available information to the pricing committee.197  Therefore, Bauer 
cannot be held liable for insider trading under either theory, unless she knew that 
the Funds were mispriced.198 
However, Bauer and the Board knew that the Fund’s problems would continue 
to result in redemptions.199 There would be no drastic change in price, until these 
redemptions actually occurred.200  By possessing this information, Bauer was 
able to redeem her personal shares before the other customers in the Fund 
redeemed their shares, thus saving her roughly $20,000.201  In light of these 
circumstances, the information that Bauer possessed was likely to be considered 
material.202 
3.  Bauer Acted with Scienter 
The court must assess whether Bauer had the intent to deceive, or in other 
words, whether she knew what she was doing, in order to determine if she acted 
with the necessary level of scienter.203  As stated in O’Hagan, full disclosure 
removes the finding of scienter.204  Bauer did not fully disclose, but she could 
not have intended to deceive the Fund because the Board approved removing the 
restriction on trading for HAI employees.205  As the trading window was open, 
Bauer did nothing wrong in doing what all HAI employees had permission to 
                                                            
funds price their shares once a day as of 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time.  Fund shares 
must be sold by the funds and their distributors at their per share NAV, and there is no 
secondary market for fund shares.  This means that all fund sales and redemptions occur 
at their per share NAV. 
Id. at 824–25 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 17 C.F.R. 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2005)). 
 197. Bullard, supra note 196, at 824–25. 
 198. Bauer did not discuss information with the Funds’ pricing services or participate in 
valuation discussions.  SEC v. Bauer, No.03-C-1427, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56780, at *11–12 
(E.D. Wis. May 25, 2011).  Instead, Bauer notified the Board about the pricing service’s concerns 
about the Funds’ NAV, but had difficulty assigning the securities a fair value.  Id. at *25–26.  
However, in the end, the pricing committee decided to use the third party pricing services valuations 
because such valuations appeared to represent the fair value of the securities.  Id. at *26–27. 
 199. Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee, supra note 170, at 35–36, 2012 WL 6018890, 
at *35–36 (quoting Bauer’s email to the Board positing that liquidation may be the only answer to 
the Fund’s continuing problems). 
 200. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 766–67 (describing the Fund’s problems and the decision to suspend 
redemptions). 
 201. See id. at 767 (discussing the changing in share prices and Bauer’s redemption of her 
shares before sending an email to make the information public). 
 202. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the element of materiality). 
 203. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the element of scienter). 
 204. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1977)) (distinguishing the facts under the misappropriation theory with another 
case that found no liability because the defendants had publicly disclosed all material information 
and, therefore did not violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s provisions requiring deception). 
 205. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 766, 771 (citing Bauer’s email encouraging HAI to disclose). 
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do.206   When she redeemed her shares, she identified herself.207  On their face, 
her actions do not appear to have the intention to deceive.208 
However, with recklessness available as the threshold to prove scienter,209 the 
SEC is more likely to establish this element “so long as they can persuade the 
fact-finder of the defendant’s greedy character or disposition.”210  In Bauer, this 
approach appears to be a reasonable objective for the SEC.  The SEC should be 
able to paint the picture of Bauer as a greedy executive by focusing on the fact 
that Bauer redeemed her shares while in possession of material information, and 
that she saved herself $20,000 at the expense of other holders of the Fund.211 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although SEC v. Bauer brought forth the novel issue of whether insider 
trading applies in the mutual fund context, the court cannot constrict its view of 
insider trading so narrowly as to discount Bauer’s conduct.  As this Note 
explains, the misappropriation theory applies to Bauer, and her actions fit the 
required elements of insider trading.  However, an important fact-specific 
question remains because scienter  is arguably proved under the standard of 
recklessness.  On remand, the district court should accept the misappropriation 
theory as applicable to Bauer, but should allow a jury to determine the question 
of fact regarding whether she acted with the requisite level of scienter.  By 
allowing the misappropriation theory to apply to mutual fund share redemptions, 
the court will ensure that an entire class of investment vehicles is afforded the 
same protections against insider trading as more traditional investment 
opportunities, such as stock purchases.  As the financial investment world 
continues to diversify and evolve, it is essential that protections exist to 
encourage investment and to promote the integrity of the markets. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 206. Id. at 771. 
 207. Id. at 766. 
 208. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 159, at 18–20, 2012 WL 6563351, at 
*18–20 (arguing that the trading window was open, that she had personal reasons to redeem her 
shares in the mutual fund, and that these reasons were not based on an intent to deceive her 
employer or the mutual fund). 
 209. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 210. Langevoort, supra note 95, at 5 (putting the burden of persuading a jury of greed on the 
prosecution). 
 211. See Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee, supra note 170, at 34, 2012 WL 6018890, 
at *34 (describing how Bauer’s position allowed her to profit unfairly at the expense of investors).  
In its brief, the SEC focused on the timing of Bauer’s redemption.  See id. at 21–24 (recounting 
Bauer’s actions leading up to her redemption).  The Commission also alerted the court to the fact 
that Bauer was a securities lawyer who devised the insider trading policies for HAI.  Id. at 51.  As 
such, of all of the corporate executives, Bauer should have understood that her conduct could 
constitute insider trading, and that she should be held to an even higher standard.  Id. 
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